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AbstrAct The paper is designed to answer such questions as where does the 
development of a new common European identity stand, which countries or 
regions show stronger or weaker European identification inside the EU, how 
has this changed over the past decades in the process of the enlargement of 
Europe, what is the value content of the new common identity, and how is this 
affecting traditional national attachment and identity. The empirical foundation 
of our study is the international comparative empirical research series of the 
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), in the years 1995 and 2003, which 
was designed to reconstruct the stock of knowledge of national and European 
identities in the member states. This study uses temporal and spatial comparison 
to consider national connectedness and the characteristics of European identity 
in various countries across Europe. Based on this data, in our paper we make an 
effort to explore what characterizes national identity in Europe, how people see 
foreigners and domestic minorities, whether we can identify the development of a 
transnational or supranational identity that goes beyond national identity, if there 
is a new frame of identification for people in Europe and to what extent we can 
expect increasing conflicts between the two types of identities.
Keywords National attachment, European identity, nationalism, globalization, 
multiculturalism, xenophobia, euroscepticism
One of the fundamental questions regarding the process of European 
unification is whether the European Union will be able to offer its citizens 
an identity that can “compete” with national identities that feed off historical 
traditions. This analysis focuses on the question – among others – of identifying 
those countries in which a strong European identity has developed, and those 
in which such ties are weak. We further explore whether the time that has 
1  Antal Örkény is professor of Sociology at the  Eötvös Loránd Sciences University, e-mail address: 
orkeny@tatk.elte.hu.
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passed since expansion has changed people’s relationship to Europe and how 
this has affected traditional national feelings and value choices.
This study uses temporal and spatial comparison to consider national 
connectedness and the characteristics of European identity in various 
countries across Europe. The empirical foundation of the study is the 
international comparative empirical research series of the International Social 
Survey Program, in the years 1995 and 20032. These projects explored what 
characterizes national identity in the world and (particularly) in Europe, how 
people see foreigners and domestic minorities, and whether we can identify 
the development of a transnational or supranational identity that goes beyond 
national identity.
One of the fundamental dilemmas of international comparative research 
is that information and data obtained on individuals in studies of traditional 
socialization process within different countries are difficult to compare. (Kohn 
1987; Elder 1976) By definition, international comparative work changes the 
contextual space of traditional sociological analysis. The interpretive field based 
on the individual is expanded into culturally and politically constructed collective 
symbolic interpretive fields such as the space of overlapping communities 
within the national framework, regional similarities and differences, or the 
interpretation of political and economic communities which form above country 
level. Issues of the relation to Europe and European identity are typical in this 
sense: they can only be analyzed as a cross-section of these interpretive fields. 
Citizens who were socialized in the national communities of the modern world 
must consider their own relationship with Europe or Europe’s various regions, 
all while a new collective identity is being constructed and old identities are 
dying out or trying to reposition themselves in new circumstances.
In this study we compare the attitudes of citizens of eighteen3 European 
countries. (Csepeli-Orkeny 1999) These countries are a good representation 
of the European Union’s one-time founders (or those who acceded until 1973), 
the mixed group of countries that acceded between 1986 and 1995, and the 
post-socialist countries that acceded under the last expansion. The three groups 
are heterogeneous, and the countries within the groups vary widely in terms 
of level of population, economic output and political influence, language and 
culture and success of modernization and historic paths. However, economic 
performance, the level of modernity and political relations with the Union (and 
2 For more information see www.issp.org
3  For the case of Germany the database made a distinction between former West- and East-
German territories. The analysis of such allowed for an examination of the connection between 
political past and national sentiments.
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its goals and its changing political content) more or less unite these various 
countries. As a result, we can state that common political interests connect the 
countries to one another4. This makes for a useful frame of comparison for 
the study of whether the intensity of connectivity to Europe has changed in 
our day, and why (or why not) the citizens of various countries believe in the 
future realization of a unified Europe.
thEorEtIcal consIdEratIons
The history of the European Union can be described as an expanding and 
increasingly complex unification process. The beginnings can be seen as a 
widening economic-market integration process which directly led to phases 
of military and political cooperation. Political integration made it necessary to 
express a political community conceptualization of the Union. This entailed 
consideration of the content of community membership for the ever-widening 
membership of the camp. A necessary result of this process is that in the past 
decade the Union has been rethinking member states’ political status and their 
relations with one another. Further, it has had to clarify legal and social norms 
that tie the community together, establish a European constitution, and make 
sense of the issue of European identity. (Deflem - Pampel 1996) This last 
aspect is particularly important for the following reason: despite the fact that 
the process of European unification has followed rationales of geopolitical 
realities, the political will of various governments (particularly the great 
powers) and national interests, the established “alliance” is increasingly 
in a position where it must rely on the support of citizens belonging to the 
Union’s member states, a support that provides for a wide social and political 
legitimacy5. 
4  The first group in the study contains the founder countries like Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
France, and three other countries (Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark) acceding to the EU in 
1973. The second group contains countries acceding to the European Union between the late 
80s and the mid 90s, like Austria, Sweden, Spain, Portugal and Finland. The last group contains 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland and Latvia. To control for divergent 
country characteristics we re-weighted national samples based on the level of population, and 
we established three groups with similar population numbers. This made it possible to conduct 
a comparison in which the characteristic demographic parameter differences do not affect the 
comparability of the three regions.
5  The failure of the effort to draft a constitution draws our attention to precisely this unsolved 
problem.
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A discussion of the question can take place in basically two interpretive 
frameworks. The first approach is the study of the actual content of 
connectedness to the European Union within the context of national 
identity. The second approach explores possible meanings of unity in terms 
of globalization, post- or supranational social integration and political 
legitimacy.
The narrative of relating to the nation-state tries to answer the question of 
the degree to which European identity is capable of being an alternative to 
traditional national identity. It further explores the degree of utility and the 
advantages of European identity for citizens in comparison to the advantages 
and security offered by national sovereignty and the community of the political 
state on national ground. Over the last centuries of capitalist modernization 
political rule and legitimacy, as well as social integration, have all been organized 
within the framework of the nation. The weight and significance of the status 
of political nation state has significantly declined over the past decades within 
the process of European unification. The advance of economic globalization 
has rendered meaningless the organization of markets on a national basis. 
European political institutions significantly limit the political sovereignty 
of member states. Cross-border labor markets and education systems offer 
people unlimited transnational mobility, while the flow of information, social 
communication and a “borderless” global media constellation brings into 
doubt the value of knowledge based on the nation alone.
Changes in conditions have led to various prognostications. There are some 
who describe this process as a kind of devolution of the traditional nation state, 
which does not exclude the possibility that economies and politics organized 
on national foundations will disappear altogether. In this approach the unified 
Europe appears as an alternative to the national community. The process of 
Europe becoming a “nation state” goes beyond the ideas of economic and 
political unification and entails intellectual and cultural communities formed 
of the continent’s ethnically, linguistically, and culturally pluralistic world, 
all making possible the birth of a European identity. At their births modern 
nation states required common myths, shared historic memories and a cultural-
linguistic identity to create unity from widely divergent groups. In a similar 
way, Europe must also find its common roots in Judeo-Christian traditions 
and ethics, the intellectual inheritance of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, 
Romanticism and Classicism, in individualism, humanism and rational 
thought, and in those characteristics that distinguish Europe from the rest of 
the world. The concept of a united Europe formed of pluralism must be based 
on the idea of branches sprouting from a common tree, where the starting 
point is not ethnicity but shared cultural traditions (Smith 1992).
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We can take a different approach to belonging to the European Union in 
a national identity context. In this case the advance of European economic-
political integration and the transformation of the EU member states can 
be seen as a parallel to process of the rebirth and reinterpretation of the 
nation, the strengthening of the role of cultural-ethnic identity, or in a more 
extreme version the development of a kind of ethnic nationalism (Brubaker 
1996; Richmond 1996). In this reading the role of national symbols and 
mythologies and ethno-history in the birth and survival of nations, or the 
definitive role of cultural resources, values and traditions in nationally based 
social integration, does not lose its pertinence for people and countries. Its 
significance may even increase. According to this view European identity and 
changing national identity are forming a symbiotic relationship. The theory 
of the harmonious coexistence of European, regional and national identities 
rests on the definition of multiple identities, according to which dynamic 
national identity based on old ethnic, linguistic, cultural and historical roots 
can combine with regional communal consciousness and shared European 
culture, value systems and historical roots to form a developing supranational 
identity (Smith 1992). Events of the previous decade – like the political misery 
surrounding the ratification of the European constitution – have cast a shadow 
over this optimistic point of view and have shed light on the inconsistencies 
or impossibilities inherent in it. Examples of the inner inconsistencies of 
the multiple identity approach include the continuous reinterpretation of 
Europe’s geographical and spatial borders, the inadequacy of geographic 
and physical and social-psychological factors, the inner tensions of cultural-
symbolic contents, the debate in reference to Christian roots in the preamble 
of the planned constitution, tensions resulting from religious divides between 
Muslims and Christians, debates over openness or closure springing from 
increased migration to Europe, and problems arising from Europe’s linguistic 
pluralism.
A different approach to membership in the European Union and European 
identity does not look to the continuation of traditional national forms of 
political and social integration and its inherent tensions, but instead seeks the 
possible content of European identity in new phenomena like the economy, the 
labor market, the transfer of knowledge, the radical new framework of global 
social communication; i.e., it takes into account the increasing importance 
of global identities. According to this, people are ascribing increasing 
significance to values which have no direct relation to traditional nation state 
norms (Habermas et al. 1998). These include human rights, the rule of law 
and democratic norms, pluralism and the search for social consensus, social 
justice, social rights and the right to a dignified life and self-determination 
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for cultures and minorities (Schlesinger  1996; Wallace 1991). These go 
beyond the national framework and make possible the creation of a kind of 
supranational identity framework. After the failure to ratify the European 
constitution, Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens released a statement in which 
they claimed: 
“Let us start to think of the EU not as an “unfinished nation” or an 
“incomplete federal state”, but instead as a new type of cosmopolitan 
project. People feel afraid of a possible federal super-state and they 
are right to do so. A resurgent Europe can’t rise up from the ruins of 
nations. The persistence of the nation is the condition of a cosmopolitan 
Europe; and today, for reasons just given, the reverse is true too. For 
a long time the process of European integration took place mainly by 
means of eliminating difference. But unity is not the same as uniformity. 
From a cosmopolitan point of view, diversity is not the problem; it is the 
solution.” (Beck-Giddens 2005:1)
Beck and Giddens’ point can be interpreted as saying that Europe must 
represent those leading social values that can define a direction for human, 
social and civilizational content and the aims of a new alliance. Nation 
states can provide the net of cultural integration. They can together offer a 
new and modern identity framework for the citizens of the Union. Another 
difference between the supranational identity (that spans nations) and the 
traditional national identity based on blood and ethnic roots is that, while 
a national framework led to the establishment and flourishing of ideologies 
of exclusion, distancing from others and differentiation, and ethnocentrism, 
European identity must be based on concepts of liberty, openness, partnership 
and the joint maximization of social utility.
These ideas, however, are currently the domain of wishful thinking and do 
not describe reality. When considering what is common across members of 
the Union, one is more likely to reach the conclusion that linguistic, ethnic, 
religious, legal, economic and political differences far outweigh common 
characteristics. This appears to be an obstacle to community formation and 
the birth of a common European identity. At this point, however, we must 
distinguish between collective social identity and the individual dimension 
of identity. While the former is prescriptive in nature and is characterized by 
permanence, principle and substance, and its acceptance is guaranteed by both 
legal and cultural sanctions, the latter is characterized by a situational nature 
and flexibility which can of course change, be replaced, or even be suspended 
by the individual. The glue of membership in the community and identity – 
no matter what type of social identity we are considering – is dependent on 
whether we take a collective or individual approach.
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When considering the personal ingredients of European identity, we must 
differentiate among several marked dimensions.
One such dimension is the role of individual utilitarian aspects (Gabel 1998; 
Gabel-Palmer 1995). A motor of the positive judgment of group membership 
is whether membership results in profit or loss for the individual. An important 
message of membership in the European Union is that on both an individual 
and societal level, many benefits are achievable that are less attainable (or 
unattainable) in the framework of the traditional nation state. The balance 
sheet of advantages and disadvantages is, however, shared unequally across 
society. As a result, the identity effect of utilitarian calculations is status-
dependent, and while certain segments of society can strengthen the positive 
identity of group membership, other segments will weaken or even bury it.
Another key source of identity is the ability of the individual to be able to 
identify with the cohesive and characteristic norms of the group. An important 
test of European identity is whether or not it is capable of providing values 
and models of social integration that distinguish the Union’s community 
from communities based on traditional ethnic and national grounds and their 
inherent values. Various analyses attempt to distinguish between nationalist, 
materialist and post-materialist values6.
The literature treats the role of individual cognitive mobility as an aspect 
of the strengthening of European identity. (Inglehart  1970; Gabel  1998) This 
theory stresses that effective political socialization can significantly strengthen 
political consciousness, political knowledge and political communication. 
These can in turn contribute to making supranational identity attractive, 
giving it more pull when compared to traditional ethnic-national or even local 
identities.
The next factor is the relation of the individual to the political community 
and the role of political commitment (Franklin et al. 1994; Franklin  et al. 1995). 
This is ingrained in the attitudes of those who are committed or opposed to the 
process of unification, the attitudes of political movements of eurosceptics, 
party preferences, or even more generally, acceptance or rejection of the 
political system. The past few decades have provided numerous examples 
of anti-Europeanism within quite divergent political views (e.g., the radical 
rejection of globalization, increasing nationalism or anarchism), whereby 
behavior radically opposed to the unification project emerges.
Finally, another factor strengthening identity is the role of inheritance and 
socialization, which is a more significant factor in countries that have long 
been members of the European Community and where the existence of the 
6 This concept was originated from Inglehart (Inglehart 1977)
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Union and its community-formation role were beyond a doubt. This factor 
and its effect may become more significant in a unifying European identity 
– it is already significant today – as seen in life period and intergenerational 
studies.
The combination of factors described above effect individual attitudes and 
human behavior. This in turn affects whether Europe’s citizens will view 
the newfound European community as merely an effective rationalization 
of economic and political cooperation – one that assists the improvement 
of living standards, but nothing more – or as something more, as a kind of 
cultural, normative choice, social community.
The following analysis will consider some elements of this complex 
question. As a first step we compare the level of attachment to Europe, and 
then reconstruct the personal cognitive background of attachment.
thE framEwork of IntErprEtatIon
The empirical comparison of European and national identities requires the 
clarification of a number of concepts. First we must consider how sociological 
and social-psychology studies have tended to differentiate between individual 
identity and collective and social identity. Personal identity is a psychological 
phenomenon of definitive significance in the development of a person’s 
image of self. Its final form is developed through socialization (Erikson 1956). 
Personal identity contains differentiated traits and characteristics, but in terms 
of its role it is essential for social interaction and for integration into various 
social groups. It is continuously reshaped in the complex system of inter-group 
relations. Social or collective identity is a framework of the interpretations 
and conclusions of a group, including the characteristics of the group, the 
conditions for membership in the group, and the attributes of separation from 
other groups (Hamilton-Sherman  1996; Karolewski 2006). Sociologists 
interpret collective identity as a social construction that forms during the 
development of a group, that is founded on accepted collective knowledge, 
that defines the rules of behavior within the group, and that demands that 
members accept rules and norms (Tajfel  1982). These social representations 
make it possible for the group members to integrate into the group, to report 
on the group, and to be cognitively and emotionally accepted.
When discussing forms of identity such as European or national identity, 
this must be interpreted as a representation of both collective and individual 
identity. The former describes the self-image framework of the European 
or national identity, while the latter pertains to the meaning of these forms 
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of association for the individual and the degree to which content elements 
of European-ness or national association are built into the individual’s self-
image and to what degree they enrich that self-image.
The various frameworks of social or collective identity result in a jumbled 
inter-group picture for the individual, one which plays a definitive role in 
the individual’s cultural socialization and integration. These reference 
frameworks jointly affect the individual’s self-image. They often compete 
with one another, while at other times they complement one another or form 
a harmonious whole. They constantly change according to which aspects and 
reference points are strengthened or weakened by the individual’s current life 
situation, roles and behavior.
From the point of view of our empirical analysis we must distinguish among 
four levels of the cultural field of social identity. The narrowest identification 
field is the local life space, which includes place of residence, workplace, and 
the microenvironment of everyday activities. This mostly means the town in 
which one lives or the city or territory to which one relates in several ways. This 
is the space where our inter-group interactions are most dense, where we have 
personal relations with the other members of the social in-group that bind us. 
The next framework in forming identity is the country and the national space 
that makes the country culturally and politically unique. Both instrumental 
and symbolic factors operate the binding system of the national community. 
The former include the political administration system, shared norms and 
the legal system, the economy’s national borders, shared infrastructure, and 
the network of services and social care. The latter is typified by a common 
language, cultural and ethnic roots, memory of a common past, practices and 
traditions, and the feeling of emotional bonds.
Local identity
Trans-national,
regional identity
Global
identity
National
identity
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The traditional frameworks defining local and national identity have been 
pulled apart by the unstoppable force of globalization over the past century. 
It is in this context that the idea of integration serving a common political 
European ideal makes sense, as does the concept of a global space that 
transcends all earlier borders and defines people’s lives. This not only opens 
up a radical new perspective in interpersonal and inter-group relations, but 
can force the social necessity of European and global identity.
The four cultural fields of social identity illustrated above together form the 
self-identity of individuals and groups and of the membership of individuals 
in groups. The relations are characterized by pluralism, complexity and 
contextualization, while counter-effects like shunning, competition, 
differentiation and exclusivity are observable. Before we investigate the 
characteristics of the four identity types across countries, we must consider 
the uniqueness of various cultural bearings.
The national framework and view, or the traditional importance of national 
identification, came into existence as a political concept in modern times. The 
challenges of modernization necessitated new forms of wide and complex 
integration on national grounds. Such challenges included the birth of the 
modern state, administrative and bureaucratic integration in a strictly defined 
territory with borders, the market-based coordination of the economy and 
the development of national capitalism. This necessitated political and social 
integration that was capable of integrating the entire political community within 
the borders, establishing a public sphere and civil society, and introducing 
forms of individual and collective political participation based on the principle 
of equality. The political state based on the spirit of the national community 
established the modern status of citizenship, while national identity provided 
the institution of citizenship with political, social and cultural content (Gellner  
1983). These frameworks are being pulled apart by the post-industrial age. 
National borders are more easily crossed, thus weakening the framework of 
national isolation. Traditional political separation based on national cleavages 
is being replaced by cooperation and joint policymaking. Economic isolation 
and national economy protectionism are replaced by global economic 
processes. In light of the transformation of national identity the most 
important change was the replacement of traditional cultural homogenization 
and dominance by cultural pluralism, multiculturalism based on ethnic and 
cultural coexistence, and the pluralization of identity. The space of political 
nationalism was increasingly taken over by ethnonationalism (Brubaker-
Cooper 2000), the communal role of national solidarity was replaced by 
alternative solidarity-based communities. Shared national ethno-history, 
common cultural roots and even the shared national language all begin to 
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lose some of their significance. The greatest challenge to the transforming 
national ideal and its related national identity is to what degree it can survive 
the transformation, what new forms cooperation, solidarity and cultural life 
within the national framework can take, and what shared values will sustain 
the significance of the coexistence of citizens.
The counterpoint to the national perspective is the global perspective. The 
past decades have not only seen the increased intensity of the globalization 
process in political, economic, migration, and flow of knowledge and 
information, but the change has brought about a new global identity as 
well. Signs of this include the salience of universal human rights, tolerance, 
pluralism, the universalization of the norms of democracy, the respect for 
human dignity, social solidarity and social justice norms. The defining aspects 
of globalization are multiculturalism, collective cultural rights, global access 
to knowledge, global communication and network building, and the global 
character of consumption. At the same time the global identity faces serious 
challenges. Such challenges include the issue of poverty, the strengthening of 
inequality across the globe, environmental and social risks, and importantly, 
the increasing pace of migration and its inherent demographic challenges and 
attendant cultural conflicts.
The European perspective, i.e., the unification of the states comprising 
the Union, on one hand goes beyond the national context, but on the other 
hand can only partially be connected to the actual trends of globalization. The 
promise of the Union is that of a continually expanding deepening process that 
offers integration in legal, economic and political terms for member states and 
their citizens. Innovation can help Europe become more competitive in many 
fields. The option of life paths that cross national borders offers opportunities 
and mobility for all those who are willing and able to convert their resources 
in transnational space. Another attraction of the Union ideal is that it rewrites 
the system in which political nation states traditionally competed, strove for 
dominance and sought to weaken one another. Instead, it establishes regional 
and supranational cooperation that transcends national borders, partnership 
and shared responsibility among member states, all while making efforts to 
even out inequalities between nations or to close the gap between member 
states. This naturally manifests itself in identity terms. For its citizens the 
Union characterized offers success, wealth, movement in an open space, wide 
opportunities, and increased security, which in turn can result in decreasing 
the individual and collective disadvantages and inequalities traditionally 
found in the national space. The Union’s political ideal can open space for 
the formation of new forms of political identity, mostly through pluralism 
and new opportunities for political participation. However, identity formation 
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is seriously limited when trying to work out common cultural values and 
roots and the emotive and symbolic aspects of “identity consciousness”. 
Shared cultural identity, common language, shared ethno-history and cultural 
memory are all lacking. Increasing cultural diversity and inherent cultural 
conflicts only make the task more daunting. While national categorization 
draws unequivocal lines between “insiders” and “outsiders”, between 
national belonging and foreigners, the ideal of a united Europe cannot draw 
borders with certainty, as such border concepts constantly change. Culturally, 
the lines dividing European culture from non-European cultures have eroded 
and been constantly questioned. But political unity and pluralism as a basis 
for a European political community is not without its own conflicts. To this 
day it is unclear whether the bordered political space of Europe defines a 
kind of unified social space, or whether Europe’s social base is nothing more 
than a virtual “community”. It is not clear what social ties and values make 
possible relations among European people. Nor are the grounds for exclusion 
of people or groups of people from the social space always clear. The inner 
tensions of European identity are rooted in such cultural and social problems. 
The answers to these problems will define the direction in which the European 
Union will change in the future and European identity itself.
assocIatIng wIth nEw EuropE and thE lEvEl  
of natIonal affIlIatIon
Having considered the theoretical aspects and the framework of 
interpretation we can now begin to empirically study the roles of national, 
European and global identities in the mechanism of social identification. This 
sociological approach, through reconstructing the components of association, 
differentiates between unconsidered, obvious and seemingly natural national 
identity in opposition to national identity presenting or reproducing constructed 
ideological elements (Csepeli 1992). First, let us consider the regularity and 
intensity of association respondents have in a spontaneous emotional manner 
in terms of their own national group and Europe itself.
Through operationalization we considered the internal, emotional and 
unconsidered experience of socially constructed distance as a starting point. 
We tried to make this understandable to respondents by using the term 
“closeness”. Association is possible by starting in local space and moving 
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outward to cover all Europe in concentric circles7. But while locality defines 
a concrete physical and geographic environment, concepts like nation and 
particularly Europe are constructions that encompass historic, symbolic and 
emotional factors.
The following graph illustrates how association with various levels develops 
in various European countries in the examined periods.
Figure 1 Patterns of a spontaneous local, national, and European identification by 
countries, cluster types
It can be seen that the national framework binds the members of communities 
tightly in most all the examined countries. Differences are apparent when 
considering whether this is paired with a European association as well, or 
whether the borders of identification are closed at the borders of the nation. It 
is surprising to see that the recent accession countries show the strongest dual 
identification (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Slovenia), while 
the attraction of European identity is weakest in the far reaches of Western 
Europe (Great Britain, Finland, Ireland) and in Latvia. Paradoxically, the 
longer a country has been a member state of the Union, and the longer it 
has enjoyed the advantages of diminishing national borders, and the freer its 
7  The original items we used in the questionnaire were the following:„”How close do you feel 
to your city” (Very close, close, not very close, not close at all, can’t choose); “And to your 
country?”; “And to your continent (Europe)?”
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citizens are to cross over to the rest of the countries, the stronger the emotional 
attraction to the national space (or the weaker the feeling of closeness to 
the open European space). Those countries that spent long decades or even 
centuries on the periphery, or were left out of the mainstream of European 
modernization, experience their national identity in conjunction with a strong 
emotional tie to Europe.
The concentric circles of association are not random. They follow a strict 
logic that establishes the attitudes of people. The construction of identity 
models on top of one another is partly thanks to the structure of society and 
is a result of parallel membership in and relations to groups. On the other 
hand it assumes that primary, secondary and other group memberships and 
the identities inherent in them are structured hierarchically (Tajfel 1982).
Regarding emotional association in the circle of older member states, 
we can observe “euroscepticism” showing in the cognitive space of some 
identification frames. Given identity types can be differentiated according 
to the values and goals that establish the identification frame. According to 
this, the national context means inner homogenization, separation, closing 
and protectionism. This is in contrast to the European relation frame, which 
is quite the opposite, emphasizing cooperation, self-restraint and the role of 
common interests. The global identity context is similar, where global-sized 
preferences and regulations (economic, security policy, or environmentalism) 
play the defining role. If these three identification frames are compared based 
on the time countries have been members of the Union, we see big differences 
in emotional attachment compared to earlier trends8.
8  The original items measuring national, European, and global identity were the following: 
“(R’s country) should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national 
economy”; “(R’s country) should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with 
other nations”; “Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in (R’s country)”; “(R’s country) 
television should give preference to (R’s country) films and programs”, “For certain problems, 
like environment pollution, international bodies (eg. UN, EU, WHO) should have the right to 
enforce solutions”. Concerning to European identity see items at footnote 15. Agreement or 
disagreement with the statements was measured on a five point scale. The indexes were made 
by simple aggregation.
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Figure 2: National, European and global identities in parallel, scale average
In view of globalization there are hardly any differences among the three 
groups of countries. A strong acceptance of globalization is evident in all 
three regions, even despite a slight decrease in such acceptance over the two 
examined periods. National identity and nationalism are stronger (and more 
enduring) the later a country joined the European Union. It appears that the 
cognitive content of belonging to a nation is a strong incentive in the service 
of the citizens of newly acceded countries, convincing Europe to finally 
take them into the fold. At the same time the biggest change occurred in 
associating with Union values. The weight of European Union identity falls 
dramatically for founder nations and new members. For the latter the strong 
positive emotional associations and expectations regarding Europe, and the 
contrast of that state with the difficulties and problems of accession is what 
leads to this dramatic drop.
In sum, neither the national, nor the European nor the global identity was 
dominant. The respondents displayed some ambivalence towards all three, 
and significant differences across countries and regions are evident only in the 
level of change over time. Such change was strongest for new member states, 
which may be an indication of identification uncertainty and inconsistencies. 
National association, however, is stable and persistent.
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conflIctIng valuEs and valuE-basEd  
cultural conflIcts
According to research on the topic, pride is an emotional aspect of all 
nations. In this section we will consider what cognitive content is mobilized 
in the identity consciousness of the members of given European nations 
by measuring spontaneous identification of national pride, all when the 
respondent tries to convince him/herself and others of his/her membership 
in the nation.
We chose the topics such that the verification of national pride was possible 
not only for those whose national past and present made it possible for all 
to experience unequivocally recognizable results and successes, but also for 
those whose pride consciousness may be rooted in murkier areas, transferred 
from the past to the present, and generally difficult to measure empirically, 
to be able to express reasons for national pride. Naturally all nations have 
their own reasons for pride, but we shall see that there are patterns governing 
which nations’ citizens refer to primarily which kinds of content when asked 
why they feel pride in their national affiliation.
We listed ten cognitive elements and asked respondents living in the given 
countries to grade their level of pride in the element on a four-point scale9. 
The dimensions offered on one hand referred to the definitive aspects of 
European modernization (economic output, political influence, defense of 
human rights, social care) and on the other hand covered the cultural roots 
of national identity through references to narrative symbols (arts, science, 
history, sporting achievements). We were primarily interested in whether 
we could map out a national value diagram and self-image using the offered 
topics, and if yes, whether we could identify country or region-specific 
characterizations on the value map.
We managed to integrate the ten topics into three value profiles. This 
differentiation partially followed the concept designed by Ronald Inglehart 
in the 1970s (Inglehart 1977), where material or modern value orientations 
were distinguished from postmodern value orientations. In the first profile 
we listed those values that played a key role in the birth of modern industrial 
societies (economic success and political influence), while the second profile 
9  The ten cognitive elements in the questionnaire measuring national pride were the following: 
the way democracy works, country’s political influence in the world; country’s economic 
achievements; its social security system;  country’s scientific and technological achievements; 
country’s achievements in sports;  country’s achievements in the arts and literature;  country’s 
armed forces; its history;  country’s fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. The 
answers were measured on a 4 point scale. 
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contained postindustrial social values like social security and solidarity, 
and the protection of human rights. We added a third profile that we called 
traditional value orientation10. We used a cluster analysis11 along the profiles 
to seek out value combinations that would allow us to draw the national pride 
maps of the given countries.
The map drawn of tradition national and modern European values clearly 
separates Europe’s western and eastern halves. The most surprising result was 
the fact that the intensity of pride feelings is quite strong in the West and that 
the source of feelings of pride was moving from traditional modernization 
successes toward postmaterial accomplishments. This is particularly the case 
for small countries or for those who experienced rapid development, like the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Ireland. Great Britain and France were 
more divided in this regard, and they often referred to national cultural and 
symbolic accomplishments alongside traditional modernization achievements. 
Germany – particularly its Western half – was an exception to this: Germans 
were proud of their country’s modernization achievements to nearly the same 
level as its postmaterialist achievements, though the importance of this feeling 
of pride was rejected by a significant proportion of the respondents.
Figure 3: Value map of national pride, cluster types by countries, percent
10  The confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the existence of the three different profiles. 
67 percent of the total variance of the included variables was described by the three new 
variables.
11  The three latent variables were clustered using K-means method.
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In contrast to this, the feelings of pride among citizens of recently acceding 
post-socialist countries could not be mobilized by any modernization topics. The 
modern accomplishments of their countries were not deemed to be important 
and were not valued deeply, which was in contrast to the weight of those values 
which were difficult to interpret and mostly celebrated subjective memory of 
common national pasts, emphasized the uniqueness of the country’s cultural 
heritage, or honored the individual accomplishments of those who were able 
to break through the limitations of their underappreciated communities. This 
kind of deficiency complex can easily undermine communal self-respect, and 
is manifest in the fact that Eastern Europe contained the highest proportion 
of those who claimed they felt no sense of pride in the accomplishments of 
their countries.
To summarize, we can clearly see how divided the countries are in terms 
of their self-images and value preferences. This causes us to be skeptical 
of unification. It is unclear how the cognitive divide between countries or 
regions might be successfully bridged, or how the value base of a unified 
identity might be created12.
This dilemma indicates another aspect of emphasized European identity, 
that of the heightened significance of multiculturalism. The social embedding 
of the multicultural point of view was measured by studying attitudes toward 
immigrants. Immigrants represent foreigness in a modern, globalizing world. 
Their acceptance or rejection is an important measurement of the tolerance of 
difference. The idea of a united Europe, which was founded on the principle 
of the acceptance and integration of ethnic, religious, linguistic and cultural 
pluralism, signals a definitive role for tolerance. Can we get a handle on 
value preferences by studying attitudes toward immigrants? We can test this 
negatively by examining the level of acceptance of xenophobia and attitudes 
supporting the rejection of immigrants.
The occurrence of xenophobia was measured using traditional stereotypes 
like agreement with statements like: immigrants are responsible for growth 
in the crime rate, or immigrants take jobs away from local people. Such 
12  As the EU initiates social, political and economic reforms aiming to reach a more equal 
geopolitical relation between member states, Inglehart expected that the idea of the EU will 
get support more among postmaterialists. Other researches, however, were only partially 
supported by the Inglehart hypothesis: in the old member states the theory was validated, 
while in the countries which  joined later, postmaterials turned out to be less supportive of 
the integration process as the materialists. Our research seems to confirm this as well: in the 
West we found a weak correlation between postmaterial values and support for the EU. In the 
post-socialist countries, however, materialist values have an effect on the support of the EU. 
About the details see: Anderson et al. 1996; Janssen 1991)
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fears can be coupled with political considerations like claiming the number 
of immigrants is too high, or that the government spends too much money 
supporting immigrants. Openness based on the toleration of difference is 
capable of acknowledging the economic advantages brought by immigrants, 
and feels that immigrants enrich the national communal culture. These 
attitudes were measured by six items in the study, each of which fit in well 
with a latent factor structure13. We then constructed a general xenophobia 
value scale by aggregation, where a high score indicated virulent rejection of 
immigrants and a low score indicated intensive acceptance.
Another group of questions measured whether respondents preferred full 
assimilation strategies or – in opposition – integration strategies based on the 
protection of cultural difference as desirable when applied to ethnic minorities14. 
High scores on the aggregated assimilation versus multiculturalism scale 
indicate a preference for assimilation while low scores indicate a preference 
for integration. The following figure lays out the strength of xenophobia and 
assimilation strategies by country.
13  The original questions asked respondents how much they agreed or disagreed with statements 
about migrants. The statements were the following: “Immigrants increase crime rates; 
“Immigrants are generally good for the economy of the (R’s country)”; “Immigrants take jobs 
away from people who were born in (R’s country)”; Immigrants improve the host society by 
bringing in new ideas and culture”; “The number of immigrants to the (R’s country) nowadays 
should be increased or reduced”; “There are too many immigrants today living in the (R’s 
country)”.
14  The original items in the questionnaire were the following: “It is impossible for people who do 
not share [Country’s] customs and traditions to become fully [Country’s nationality]”; “Ethnic 
minorities should be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions”; 
“It is better for society if groups maintain their distinct customs and traditions or it is better if 
groups adapt and blend into the larger society”.
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Figure 4: Xenophobia and multiculturalism, scale average by countries 
Europe is again split in two, in a way that is similar to the split along 
pride lines. The developed Western European countries are relatively open 
to immigrants – though it would be a stretch to call them enthusiastic. The 
lowest level of rejection was measured in Ireland, Spain and Sweden, where 
the xenophobia indicator was at a medium level. Contrasted to this are the 
new members from the former socialist block. The citizens of these countries 
– including those in the Eastern part of Germany and surprisingly Italians 
too – were impetuous and rejecting of foreigners. At the same time, the 
measurable antipathy toward foreigners in the Eastern half of Europe was not 
paired with an assimilation strategy for domestic ethnic minorities, while in 
the more modernized West tolerance was paired with a zest for assimilation 
policies. This was observable in Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and particularly in Denmark. This mixed picture is likely due to 
divergent sociological and socio-psychological processes. Western Europe, 
which has raised the postmaterial ideal of multiculturalism up its flagpole, 
is concurrently a target area for ever increasing immigration. In many places 
this results in structural xenophobia, behind which we see social tensions 
that arise from mass migration and cultural conflict. Official policies of 
accepting cultural difference and pronouncing tolerance are in vain where 
immigration has resulted in impassioned rejection or vehement expectations 
of assimilation. In Eastern Europe, xenophobia functions according to a 
different logic. Here migration does not present a significant social challenge. 
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
4,5
5
HͲH
ungary
CZͲCzechRepublic
SKͲSlovakRepublic
DͲEͲG
erm
anyͲEast
IͲItaly
SLO
ͲSlovenia
LVͲLatvia
PLͲPoland
G
BͲG
reatBritain
AͲA
ustria
DͲW
ͲG
erm
anyͲW
est
FͲFrance
PͲPortugal
SFͲFinland
DͲD
enm
ark
N
LͲN
etherlands
SͲSw
eden
SͲSpain
IRLͲIreland
xenophobia forcedassimilation
53EUROPEAN INDENTITY AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT: HARMONY OR DISSONANCE
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2011) 
The number of immigrants is low. However, the national rebirths following 
the regime transformations and their accompanying searches for identity were 
often based on cultural homogeneity. This search for self-identification treats 
foreigners as a nuisance, which follows logically from the suspicion of the 
few immigrants present, the sometimes violent rejection of difference (from 
the majority), all while the assimilation of national ethnic minorities is not 
necessarily a goal desired by the majority of society.
Europe has proclaimed the unprecedented goal of establishing cultural 
integration based on the (ever expanding) foundation of cultural pluralism. 
But in daily life cultural flashpoints  not only refuse to go away, but seem 
to be causing more and more conflict. It appears that the maximization of 
efficiency is an easier goal than that of peace between divergent cultures.
attractIons and choIcEs
To this point we have presented some affective (associational) and 
cognitive (sense of pride, openness and acceptance of others) factors, as well 
as aggregations of such, which well illustrate the variants of content elements 
of association and identification present in the collective consciousness of 
various European countries and the identities of their citizens. Our data clearly 
shows that Europe’s diverse historical and political regions, or its countries of 
various cultural and historical backgrounds, are significantly different, which 
brings into doubt the possibility of unifying a consciousness.
Another analytic logic would have us create groups along identity factors 
from among all the populations of European Union member states. We 
would then continue to examine the degree to which such groups occur in the 
countries of the Union15. The members of these groups would connect their 
identity construction and value orientation in unique ways.
In this analysis we made use of cultural association and numerous cognitive 
and affective elements of social identity. When searching for types we made 
use of emotional components of European and national association16, the level 
15  Support for the European Union was measured by the following items: [Country] should 
follow [European Union] decisions, even if it does not agree with them. EU should have 
more power than national government If there were a referendum today to decide whether 
[Country] does or does not become a member of the [European Union], would you vote in 
favor or would you vote against?
16 See references for emotional components in footnote 7
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of ethnocentrism17 and national pride18, the strength of political and economic 
nationalism19, and attitudes toward the assimilation of minorities and the 
rejection of difference20. We used these in a cluster analysis21 that resulted in 
three characteristic orientations.
The first characteristic identity type can be called a cosmopolitan patriot 
in the footsteps of Habermas (Habermas-Ratzinger 2005). The members of 
this group feel closest to the theoretical construct of the European citizen. 
They typically have a strong affinity for Europe, are ambivalent about 
globalization, and reject traditional political nationalism to at least a moderate 
degree. The cosmopolitan patriot is tolerant of foreigners, wants to see his/
her nation as inclusive and not exclusive and would rather have domestic 
minorities integrate than assimilate. Such a person avoids the traps of national 
ethnocentrism, and has a feeling of pride that is realistic and moderate.
We have named the second type the ‘traditional cultural nationalist’, who 
has many ties to Europe and supports his/her country’s accession to the EU. 
This group is driven by a kind of utilitarianism. They have a high level of 
nationalism and ethnocentrism paired with a strong feeling of traditional 
cultural pride, but they support globalization if it serves the interests of the 
national community. Maximization of profit for the own group, which is 
present in both national and European space, results in an identity profile that 
is not free from welfare chauvinism. This is indicated by suspicion or even 
rejection of foreigners, a wish to close the national borders, and unwillingness 
to share national spoils with others. They expect moderate assimilation of 
domestic minorities.
We have named the third type ‘national chauvinist’. It is typified by strong 
17  The gist of the ethnocentric view is that one clearly overvalues his in-group, while he 
undervalues out-groups. Yet ethnocentrism is not nationalism. We can speak of nationalism 
when this ethnocentric view infuses the actions of the whole community and becomes a 
system-building ideology. It is a generally accepted proposition in social psychology since 
Sumner (Sumner, 1906) that groups have a feeling of superiority which is not only a natural 
source of group pride and group identity but also a source for despising and contemptousness 
toward the members of other groups. The ethnocentrism scale was aggregated from three items 
in the questionnaire, measured on five point scale: “I would rather be a citizen of [country] 
than of any other country in the world”; “The world would be a better place if people from 
other countries were more like the [country’s nationality]”; “Generally speaking, [Country] is 
a better country than most other countries”
18 See references for national pride at footnote 9
19 See references for political and economic nationalism at footnote 8
20 See references for multiculturalism at footnote 14
21 The clustering was done using K-means method
55EUROPEAN INDENTITY AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT: HARMONY OR DISSONANCE
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2011) 
political nationalism, the one-sided prioritization of national interests, and 
strong protectionism. This group sees its nation as a closed and self-interested 
community that internally assimilates, closes its borders to foreigners, 
and in terms of national categorization it is strict and draws borders. The 
national chauvinist group does not show openness to the outside either and 
is characterized by euroscepticism. They are most likely to reject the idea of 
integration in the Union, and they display the lowest support for social and 
cultural values of integration. 
In the contexts of the three types of national identity the differences by 
country are quite significant. Cosmopolitan patriotism is centered mostly in 
the Western half of Europe. Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and France 
are the leaders in this respect, but other Western European countries also have 
a proportion of this group that is high, above thirty percent.
Traditional cultural nationalists are to be found mostly in post-socialist 
countries that entered the Union recently. Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, Poland and Latvia belong in this group, although this type also 
appears in Southern Europe (Italy and Portugal).
The most surprising finding is the relatively high proportion of national 
chauvinists. It is particularly interesting to note the attraction of this position 
in some countries of the Western region, particularly in small countries like 
Ireland, Austria and Finland, although it is also surprising to see the high 
number of people attracted to this identity in Great Britain.
To summarize, it appears that the countries of Europe are suffering a 
kind of value polarization, with the only difference being the pole around 
which the communities are polarized. In the West polarization is along the 
cosmopolitan vs. national socialist line, while further east polarization is in 
terms of traditional nationalism vs. national chauvinism.
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Figure 5: Different types of national identity patterns, percent by countries
Figure 6: Different types of national identity patterns, percent 
This picture is permanent in terms of time. Data collected in 1995 and in 
2003 show very little change among profiles, although there may have been 
some rearrangement in the inner contents of the profiles. The overall view 
does not truly change.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
DͲW
ͲG
erm
anyͲW
est
N
LͲN
etherlands
DͲEͲG
erm
anyͲEast
SͲSw
eden
FͲFrance
SͲSpain
SFͲFinland
IͲItaly
DͲD
enm
ark
G
BͲG
reatBritain
SKͲSlovakRepublic
IRLͲIreland
LVͲLatvia
SLO
ͲSlovenia
CZͲCzechRepublic
AͲA
ustria
PͲPortugal
PLͲPoland
HͲH
ungary
Cosmopolitanpatriotism TraditionalculturalnationalismandEUsupport
Politicalnationalismandchauvinism
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
theoldestEU
memberstates
accedingcountries
1986Ͳ1995
lastaccedingpostͲ
socialistcountries
theoldestEU
memberstates
accedingcountries
1986Ͳ1995
lastaccedingpostͲ
socialistcountries
1995 2003
Politicalnationalismandchauvinism
Traditionalculturalnationalism
Cosmopolitanpatriotism
57EUROPEAN INDENTITY AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT: HARMONY OR DISSONANCE
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2011) 
conclusIon
The most important lesson learned from the ISSP research series on national 
identity is that currently a European perspective, national identity and the 
process of globalization are each aspects of the everyday lives and personal 
identity of people living in the region. The feeling of nationality – as a factor 
of community identity formation and a glue of spirituality – has lost little 
pertinence. Although nationality aspects play a diminishing role in people’s 
life course, career and mobility decision and in the development of personal 
identity, belonging to a national community is still of definitive significance 
in satisfying personal spiritual and symbolic needs and in the formation of 
collective identity. The weakening of the pertinence of borders separating the 
physical breadth of political states does not lead to national nihilism, but it does 
increase the significance of inherited cultural markers from earlier periods of 
national existence. This interesting dynamic develops among various identity 
dimensions, mainly in terms of national belonging and European identity, all 
in the context of strengthening globalization. The results of our analysis can be 
summarized from three aspects: first is the relationship between European and 
national identity, second is the connection between globalization and European 
unity, and third is the European region and immigration.
the relationship between European and national identity
The study has shown that European identity is not a melting pot. The process 
of unification has opened a new phase of cooperation among nations and has 
attained significant success in terms of efficiency, various joint development 
programs, and reducing inequalities among nations and regions. At the same 
time European must face a challenge when identifying its common cultural 
foundations, whereby divergent pasts, linguistic and cultural diversity and 
diverse social and cultural values continue to raise walls between the citizens 
of member states that are hard to traverse. This all strengthens Europe’s 
value polarization, which can be a factor in the diminishing popularity of the 
European identity promise.
The research project uncovered dividing lines within Europe in several 
aspects. We can observe opposition between an identity that is traditional, 
closed, based on cultural pride, and often burdened by extreme nationalism 
on the one hand, and an identity that is modern, cosmopolitan, respectful of 
individual and communal rights, and based on fairness and equality on the 
other. An open and a closed view system exist side by side and are manifested 
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in interpretations of the relations between nations, between Europe and the 
rest of the world, and the acceptance of immigrants. We also uncovered a 
nationalist vs. cosmopolitan ideological cleavage. The coexistence of these 
divergent mentality types on the one hand applies to Europe’s historical 
regions, and on the other hand is present within each country, although with 
varying proportions and significance.
The idea of a new united Europe necessitates a new conceptualization 
of the nation in each member state. Our study has shown that the new 
conceptualization of nation can be organized around a modern idea of 
citizenship. The legal and political frames of citizenship are retained and 
enhanced with the cultural and psychological sources of national identity, thus 
lowering the difference between “civic nation” and “ethnic nation” paradigms 
(Meehan 1993; Eder 2001). At the same time we can see that the broadening 
of the concept of citizenship presents European citizens with an opportunity 
to choose between the sides of dividing lines like acceptance vs. banishment, 
tolerance and intolerance, political loyalty and ethnocentric insistence.
This choice is a serious challenge for member states that joined just recently. 
The countries of Central and Eastern Europe lag behind significantly in historic 
and economic terms. They lack modern political cultures and struggle with 
a democratic deficit, which can easily result in the dominance of traditional 
values and culture, allowing nationalism to fulfill the primary functions in 
identity formation and self-identity. This will not decrease, but will instead 
increase the distance between various regions.
The founding member states of the EU have had decades to adapt to the 
new situation brought about by economic and then political integration. In 
the interests of entry they limited national sovereignty, mobilized citizens 
to a level unprecedented in the new community of states, and dynamically 
developed their economies. The new wave of expansion has, however, 
strengthened structural and cultural polarization, which has had a significant 
effect on older member states. This might explain why the longer a country 
has experienced the Union in everyday life, the weaker its European identity, 
and vice versa: the more distant accession seems for a country the stronger 
the psychological force attracting citizens to the Union. The strong emotional 
ties begin to weaken significantly after accession in new member states, all 
while citizens are forced to acknowledge that economic and social differences 
between member states will not diminish in the post-accession period.
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globalization and European unification
The unification of Europe is a part of the process of globalization, and 
partly a distancing of Europe from the non-European world. This duality 
is rife with paradoxes and tensions: when people form opinions based on 
individual perspectives and welfare (consumption, lifestyle, security, 
environmental protection) they support the former point of view, but when 
they pass judgments based on issues like free global economic competition, 
welfare and social concerns, or cultural unity, the concept of isolation and 
distancing is more salient. This leads to the duality whereby the idea of 
globalization is partly accepted, but when the world as a whole is concerned 
people begin to have objections to the unification project. This is all covered 
by the phenomenon of welfare chauvinism: globalization can be a threat to the 
attained high standard of living in successful countries. However, in the post-
socialist region, where people’s attitudes on standard of living are defined by 
positive expectations and not the stability of current standards, Europe and 
the world become the same thing, and attitudes on globalization apply to the 
Union just as they apply to the world.
Our data also indicated that criticism of and skepticism toward globalization 
increased in Europe between the observed periods. The weakening of pro-
globalization does not increase the chances of European success when 
competing with other regions of the globe, as it prognosticates a closed 
European consciousness. Just as nationalism as isolated in the national 
framework became an obstacle to development and a source of serious conflict 
in the twentieth century, a future strengthening of a “European nationalism” 
can become a competitive disadvantage for the Union. However, we must 
acknowledge that nationalism in the twentieth century did advance social 
integration in some countries, and thus European nationalism may help 
develop Union unity. The trick is in the balancing.
the European region and the challenge of immigration
The third controversial factor of unification is the judgment of foreigners 
and the phenomenon of xenophobia which – to varying degrees – is a dominant 
emotional type in all countries in the study, in both periods. Various countries, 
independent of their development and situation, express suspicion of foreigners 
for various reasons. In developed countries, where immigration is a definitive 
element of social processes, it is individual fears and frustrations that generate 
suspicion and rejection of foreigners. In those countries – including new 
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member states – where immigration is not a mass phenomenon, the roots of 
xenophobia are ideological in nature and end up feeding collective nationalism, 
the principle of community based on cultural dominance, and the kind of 
traditional mentality that rejects difference outright. As the last one hundred 
years of globalization processes have forever broken down obstacles to free 
movement in the world, and as continued increases in migration appear to be 
unstoppable, Europe is at a crossroads. The Europe of the future will unite 
in the name of ethnocentrism-based opposition to strangers, or conversely, it 
will be able to work out and effectively communicate an identity model that 
ties Europe together with humanity in the name of universalism. The true test 
of universalism then will be how Europe handles the migration issue.
lItEraturE
Anderson, C. J., & Reichert, M. S. (1996): Economic Benefits and Support for 
Membership in the EU: A Cross-National Analysis. Journal of Public Policy, 15 
(3), 231-249.
Beck, Ulrich and Giddens, Anthony (2005): Nationalism has now become the enemy 
of Europe’s nations, The Guardian, October 4., see http://www.guardian.co.uk/
politics/2005/oct/04/eu.world
Brubaker, Roger (1996): Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National 
Question in the New Europe, Cambridge University Press.
Brubaker, Roger and Cooper, F. (2000): „Beyond identity”, Theory and Society 29, 
pp. 1-47.
Csepeli, György (1992): Nemzet által homályosan. Budapest, Századvég Kiadó
Csepeli, György  Örkény, Antal (1999): “International Comparative Investigation into 
the National identity”, Szociológiai Szemle, Special Issue in English, 1999., pp. 
95-114.
Deflem, Mathieu; Pampel, Fred C. (1996): “The Myth of Postnational Identity: 
Popular Support for European Unification”, Social Forces, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Sep., 
1996), pp. 119-143.
Eder,K. (2001): A Theory of Collective Identity Making Sense of the Debate on a 
‘European Identity’, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 12, No. 4, 427-447 
(2009)
Elder, Joseph W. (1976): “Comparative Cross-National Methodology”, Annual Review 
of Sociology, Vol. 2, pp. 209-230.
Erikson, E. H. (1956): “The problem of ego identity”, Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association, 4, pp. 56-121.
Franklin, M., Marsh, M., & Wlezien, C. (1994): „Attitudes toward Europe and Referendum 
Votes: A Response to Siune and Svensson”, Electoral Studies, 13(2), pp. 117-121.
Franklin, M., Van der Eijk, C., & Marsh, M. (1995): „Referendum outcomes and 
61EUROPEAN INDENTITY AND NATIONAL ATTACHMENT: HARMONY OR DISSONANCE
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  1 (2011) 
trus in government: Public support for Europe in the wake of Maastricht”, West 
European Politics, 18
Gabel, M., & Palmer, H. (1995): „Understanding Variation in Public Support for 
European Integration”, European Journal of Political Research, 27(1), 3-19.
Gabel, M. (1998): „Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of 
Five Theories”, The Journal of Politics, 60(2), pp. 333-354.
Gellner, E. (1983): Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Blackwell
Habermas, J., Cronin, C., & De Greiff, P. (1998): The inclusion of the other: studies in 
political theory [Einbeziehung des Anderen.] . Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Habermas, J. and Ratzinger, J. (2005) The Dialectics of Secularization.  San Francisco, 
CA: Ignatius Press, 2005. 85 p.
Hamilton, D.L., and  Sherman, S.J. (1996): „Perceiving persons and groups”, 
Psychological Review, 103, pp. 336-355.
Inglehart, Roger. (1970): „Cognitive Mobilization and European Identity”, 
Comparative Politics, 3(1), pp. 45-70.
Inglehart, Roger (1977): The silent revolution: changing values and political styles 
among Western publics. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press
Janssen, J. I. H. (1991): Postmaterialism, Cognitive Mobilization and Public Support 
for European Integration. British Journal of Political Science, 21, 443-468.
Karolewski, I. P. (2006): “Citizenship and collective identity in Europe”, in Karolewski 
I. P., & Kaina V. (Eds.), European Identity: Theoretical Perspectives and Empirical 
Insights,  Berlin: Lit Verlag pp. 23-59,.
Kohn, Melvin L. (1987): “Cross-National Research as an Analytic Strategy: American 
Sociological Association, 1987. Presidential Address”, American Sociological 
Review, Vol. 52, No. 6 (Dec., 1987), pp. 713-731.
Meehan, E. (1993): Citizenship and the European Community. Sage, London
Richmond, Anthony H. (1996): “Ethnic Nationalism and Post industrialism”, In 
Hutchinson, John; Smith, Anthony D. eds. Ethnicity, Oxford University Press,. pp. 
289 299.
Schlesinger, Philip (1996): “Europeanness, A New Cultural Battlefield”, In Hutchinson, 
John; Smith, Anthony D. eds. Ethnicity, Oxford University Press, pp. 316 325.
Smith, Anthony D. (1992): “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, 
International Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 1 (Jan., 1992), pp. 55-76. 
Sumner, W.G. (1906): Folkways, A Study of the Sociological Importance of Usage, 
Manners, Customs, Moves, and Moral. Dover publication, NC.
Tajfel, Henri (1982): Social Identity and Intergroup Relations, Cambridge University 
Press.
Wallace, Helen (1991): “The Europe that came in from the cold”, International Affairs, 
Vol. 67, No. 4 (Oct., 1991), pp. 661-664.
